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Abstract We present a general framework to study the project selection problem
in an organization of fallible decision-makers. We show that when the orga-
nizational size and the majority rule for project acceptance are optimized simul-
taneously, the optimal quality of decision-making, as determined by the decision
criterion, is invariant, and depends only on the expertise of decision-makers. This
result clarifies that the circumstances under which the decision-making quality
varies with the organizational structure are situations where the organizational size
or majority rule is restricted from reaching the optimal level. Moreover, in contrast
to earlier findings in the literature that the hierarchy and the polyarchy are generally
sub-optimal structures, we show that when the size, structure and decision criterion
are simultaneously optimized, the hierarchy and the polyarchy are in fact the only
possible optimal organizational structures when decision-making costs are present.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the optimal design of an organization in which a team of fallible
decision-makers collectively decides whether to accept or reject investment projects.
We consider the case where project evaluation takes place simultaneously in a
committee of identically skilled decision-makers. Each decision-maker observes a
signal about the quality of the investment project and endogenously selects a
decision criterion (i.e. the project evaluation standard), such that if the signal exceeds
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the decision criterion, he or she votes to accept the project; otherwise, the decision-
maker votes to reject the project. The expertise of a decision-maker is measured by
the relative likelihoods of correctly selecting good projects and rejecting bad
projects. Based on the voting profile, the organization’s decision problem is to accept
or reject each project based on a pre-determined majority rule. Our objective is to
study the optimal relationship between the structure of the organization—as defined
by its size and the majority rule for project acceptance—and the quality of decision-
making—as determined by the choice of the decision criterion.
There are several contributions of this paper. Firstly, we generalize the project
selection framework presented in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1998), using the concept
of monotone likelihood ratio condition to model the notion that a decision-maker is
more likely to observe a signal of higher value for a good project than for a bad
project.
Secondly, and more importantly, we extend the analysis beyond Ben-Yashar and
Nitzan (1998) to consider the simultaneous optimal choice of the organizational
size, the majority rule for project acceptance and the decision criterion. This
problem was not considered in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1998). We show that when
the structure and quality of organizational decision-making are selected optimally,
the optimal decision criterion is in fact invariant with respect to the size of the
organization, the majority acceptance rule, as well as the quality of the investment
environment (Proposition 1). The optimal quality of organizational decision-
making is only a function of the expertise of the decision-makers (to be explained in
Section 2) when the optimal organizational structure is adopted. The implication of
this result is that the optimal design of the organization can be conducted as a two-
step process: first, determine the optimal decision criterion, and then choose the
optimal combination of organizational size and project acceptance majority rule.
Thirdly, the invariance property of the optimal decision criterion has two im-
portant implications on the optimal organizational structure. One implication is that
organizations of different sizes perform equally well in terms of the expected gross
project payoff, if the optimal decision criterion is adopted. However, when there are
fixed costs in employing additional decision-makers, the optimal organizational
structure will be the smallest feasible one that maximizes the organization’s
expected net payoff. Provided the decision criterion is set at the invariant optimal
level, there are only two possible types of optimal organizational structures: the
hierarchy (where full consensus is required for acceptance) for a mediocre
investment environment, and the polyarchy (where the support of one decision-
maker is sufficient) for an above-average investment environment (Proposition 2).
This result has interesting implications when related to the analysis in Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (2001) and Koh (2005), which studied the optimality of the
hierarchical and polyarchical decision structures.1 Both papers demonstrated the
fragility of the hierarchy and polyarchy as optimal organizational structures when
1 The literature on fallible collective decision-making includes the seminal work of Nitzan and
Paroush (1985), Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988), Paroush and Karotkin (1989), as well as more
recent work of Sah (1990, 1991), Koh (1992, 1994a,b, 2005), Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997,
2001) and Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2001). The strategic aspects of collective decision-making
have been studied by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesedorfer (1998), Dekel
and Piccione (2000), Li, Rosen and Suen (2001), and Persico (2004).
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the decision criterion is fixed at a level that is not necessarily the optimal level.
However, as we show in this paper, if the decision criterion is set at the optimal
level and there are fixed costs to enlarging the organization, the hierarchy and
polyarchy structures are in fact the unique optimal organizational structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we generalize the
project selection model of Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1998). In Section 3, we examine
different aspects of the optimal organizational design—the decision criterion, the
majority rule for project acceptance, and the organizational size. In Section 4, we
present the results in Propositions 1 and 2 and discuss their relationships to Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1998, 2001) and Koh (2005). Section 5 concludes the paper
with a discussion of the results.
2 A generalization of the project selection model
We first present a generalization of the project selection framework described in
Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1998). This generalization is not a trivial exercise. We
shall show that if the information structure satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio
condition (to be described shortly), this is sufficient to generate the results in Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1998), which relied on stronger assumptions of the information
structure to obtain their results. The generalized framework presented here shows
that the results of Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1998) are valid in a more general
setting.
Consider an organization of n members whose objective is to maximize the
expected payoff from selecting and implementing projects. There are two types of
projects: good (G) and bad (B). For each project, there are two possible decisions:
accept (A) or reject (R). LetQ (=G or B) denote the state of a project, whileD (=A or
R) denote the decision on the project. The expected payoff associated with the
decision on a particular project isΠ(D|Q). Clearly, we require thatΠ(A|G)>Π(A|B)
andΠ(R|B) ≥Π(R|G), so that there is an optimal action associated with each type of
project. Let Π(G) ≡Π(A|G)−Π(R|G), and Π(B) ≡Π(R|B)−Π(A|B). The proportion
of good projects in the project pool is assumed to be fixed at α, where 0 < α <1.
The expertise of decision-makers is modeled as follows. We assume that
decision-makers can differentiate good projects from bad projects, but only
imperfectly in the following sense. When a decision-maker evaluates a project, he
or she observes a signal r about each project, where r 2 ½

r; r  . Let h(r|Q) and
H(r|Q) denote, respectively, the density function and conditional distribution
function for a signal, conditional on the project being of quality Q. We assume that
both h(r|Q) and H(r|Q) are continuously differentiable, and that h(r|Q) satisfies the
monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC). The MLRC property means that for
two signals r1 and r2, where r1>r2,
h r1jGð Þ
h r2jGð Þ >
h r1jBð Þ
h r2jBð Þ (1)
Therefore, a decision-maker is more likely to observe a more favorable signal r1
compared with r2, when the project is a good project (i.e. of qualityG), then if it is a
bad project (i.e. of quality B). We require the following lemma for our analysis.
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Lemma 1 If h(r|Q) satisfies the monotone-likelihood ratio condition,
a½  h rjBð Þ
1 H rjBð Þ >
h rjGð Þ
1 H rjGð Þ ; b½ 
h rjGð Þ
H rjGð Þ >
h rjBð Þ
H rjBð Þ ; c½ H rjGð Þ < H rjBð Þ:
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A. Lemma 1[c] implies that H(r|G)
dominates H(r|B) in terms of first-order stochastic dominance, and was also shown
in Proposition 1 of Milgrom (1981).
All projects are indistinguishable to the decision-makers, ex ante, before
undergoing any evaluation. Decision-makers evaluate the project independently,
and based on their assessment (which is captured in the signal r), communicate a
binary report (“Yes” or “No”), summarizing their opinion on the appropriate action
to take on a project. Let s=1 denote a “Yes” vote, which is a recommendation to
accept the project; similarly, s=0 denotes a “No” vote, which is a recommendation
to reject the project. In deciding how to vote for a project, each decision-maker
selects a decision criterion (i.e. cutoff point) θ so that if the signal r is greater (less)
than θ, the decision-maker votes ‘Yes’ (‘No’). A decision-maker’s choice of θ
therefore affects the overall quality of organizational decision-making.
The probability that a decision-maker will give a positive review on a project is
P(1|Q)=1−H(θ|Q). The probability of a project receiving a bad review is P(0|Q)=H
(θ|Q). Decision-making ability is imperfect in the sense that P(1|G)<1 and P(1|B)
>0, but discriminatory in the sense that P(1|G)>P(1|B).
For a given decision criterion, θ, a measure of the decision-maker’s expertise to
screen and select good projects is given by the following log-likelihood ratio,
"A  ln 1 H jGð Þ½   ln 1 H jBð Þ½  (2)
Similarly, the expertise to discriminate and reject bad projects is measured by
"R  lnH jBð Þ  lnH jGð Þ (3)
Since H(θ|G)<H(θ|B), it follows that ɛA>0 and ɛR>0. By Lemma 1, ɛA is increasing
in θ, while ɛR is decreasing in θ. Raising the decision criterion θ improves the
expertise for selecting good projects but the expertise to screen out bad projects
suffers.
3 Designing the optimal organization
In this section, we derive the results necessary for the construction of the optimal
organization. For a given organizational size of n, a project is accepted only if it
receives at least k positive reviews. Let ~ ¼ 1; ::: ; nð Þ denote the set of decision
criteria. The probability that a project will be accepted is
P ~; k; n;Q
  ¼Xn
j¼k
Cnj
Y
i2Sj
1 H ijQð Þ½ 
Y
i=2Sj
H ijQð Þ (4)
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where Sj is a subset of j (out of n) decision-makers that vote “Yes” for the project.
For each project evaluated, the unconditional expected utility payoff to the
organization is
V ~; k; n
  ¼ P ~; k; n;G  Gð Þ  1 ð ÞP ~; k; n;B  Bð Þ (5)
There are several dimensions in designing the optimal organization for project
evaluation: the decision criteria, the optimal majority rule for project acceptance
and the optimal organizational size. We consider each aspect in turn.
3.1 Selecting the decision criterion
For a given organizational structure, k and n, each decision-maker i independently
chooses a decision criterion (i.e. cutoff point), taking the decision criteria of other
decision-makers as given. Making use of the following relationship,
P ~; k; n;Q
  ¼ H ijQð ÞP ~i; k; n 1;Q 
þ 1 H ijQð Þ½ P ~i; k  1; n 1;Q
 
where ~i ¼ 1; :::; i1; iþ1; :::; nð Þ , the partial derivative of V ~; k; n
 
with
respect to θi is given by
@V ~; k; n
 
@i
¼  Gð Þh ijGð Þ P ~i; k  1; n 1;G
  P ~i; k; n 1;G  
 1 ð Þ Bð Þh ijBð Þ

P ~i; k  1; n 1;B
 
P ~j; k; n 1;B
 
Let ~* ¼ *1 ;::; *n
 
denote the set of optimal decision criteria, and ~*i ¼
*1 ;::; 
*
i1; 
*
iþ1;::; 
*
n
 
. The first-order condition for decision-maker i’s optimal
decision criterion, denoted θi
*, and evaluated at ~* , is given by
@V ~; k; n
 
@i

~
¼  Gð Þh i
G P ~i; k  1; n 1;G 
P ~i; k; n 1;G
   1 ð Þ Bð Þh i B 
P ~i; k  1; n 1;B  P ~i; k; n 1;B  ¼ 0
(6)
This leads to the following result:
 ¼
hð*i jBÞ Pð ~*i; k  1; n 1;BÞ  Pð ~*i; k; n 1;BÞ
h i
hð*i jGÞ Pð ~*i; k  1; n 1;GÞ  Pð ~*i; k; n 1;GÞ
h i (7)
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where
   Gð Þ
1 ð Þ Bð Þ (8)
is a measure of the quality of the investment environment.2 Similarly, we can show
that the necessary second-order condition for θi
*, evaluated at ~* , is given by
@V 2 ~; k; n
 
@2i

~
¼  Gð Þh0 i
G  P ~i; k  1; n 1;G  P ~i; k; n 1;G  
¼  1 ð Þ Bð Þh0 i
B P ~i; k  1; n 1;B 
P ~i; k; n 1;B
  < 0 ð9Þ
where h0 rjQð Þ  @h rjQð Þ@r . Since decision-makers are assumed to be identically
skilled, a symmetric equilibrium θ* exists, and accordingly, will be the focus of our
analysis henceforth. Hence, utilizing the relationship that
P ~i; k; n 1;Q
  P ~i; k  1; n 1;Q 
¼ Cn1k1 1 H *jQð Þ½ k1H *jQð Þnk
this implies that at the symmetric equilibrium θ*, the condition in Eq. 7 can be
rewritten as
 ¼ h *jBð Þ 1 H *jBð Þ½ 
k1H *jBð Þnk
h *jGð Þ 1 H *jGð Þ½ k1H *jGð Þnk (10)
Similarly, the necessary second-order condition for the optimal θ*, in Eq. 9, can be
rewritten as
h0 *jGð Þ > h0 *jBð Þ 1 H *jBð Þ½ 
k1H *jBð Þnk
1 H *jGð Þ½ k1H *jGð Þnk (11a)
Substituting the relationship in Eq. 10 into Eq. 11a leads to the following condition:
h0 *jGð Þ
h *jGð Þ >
h0 *jBð Þ
h *jBð Þ (11b)
Using Lemma 1 and the condition for θ* in Eq. 11a, we take natural logs on both
sides of Eq. 10, and differentiate with respect to k and n in turn to obtain the
following results:
d*
dk
¼ Z ln H *jBð Þ
1 H *jBð Þ  ln
H *jGð Þ
1 H *jGð Þ
 	
> 0 (12a)
2 The investment environment is said to be above average (mediocre) if β is greater (less) than 1.
When β=1, the investment environment is said to be of neutral quality.
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d*
dn
¼ Z lnH *jGð Þ  lnH *jBð Þ½  < 0 (12b)
where
Z1  h
0 *jBð Þ
h *jBð Þ 
h0 *jGð Þ
h *jGð Þ þ k  1ð Þ
h *jGð Þ
1 H *jGð Þ 
h *jBð Þ
1 H *jBð Þ
 	
þ n kð Þ h *jBð Þ
H *jBð Þ 
h *jGð Þ
H *jGð Þ
 	
< 0
Let us now relate the results in Eqs. 12a and 12b to Theorems 1 and 2 in Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1998). Using the notation in the present paper, the following
sufficiency conditions were assumed regarding the information structure in Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1998):
d 1 H jGð Þ½ 
d
< 0;
d2 1 H jGð Þ½ 
d2
< 0;
@2P ~; k; n;G
 
@ 1 H jGð Þ½ 2 < 0
dH jBð Þ
d
> 0;
d2H jBð Þ
d2
< 0;
@2 1 P ~; k; n;B  
@H jBð Þ2 < 0
Under these sufficiency conditions, Theorem 1 of Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1998)
states that d
*
d > 0 where   kn , while Theorem 2 of Ben-Yashar and Nitzan
(1998) states that d
*
dn > 0 , when certain conditions hold. Since
d
dn ¼ 1n > 0,
Theorem 1 of Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1998) is equivalent to our result in Eq. 12a,
which is obtained only under the assumption that the informational structure satisfy
the MLRC property. Furthermore, the MLRC property is also a necessary and
sufficient condition to obtain the result in Eq. 12b. Hence, Theorem 2 of Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1998) is also valid in a more general setting.
3.2 Optimal majority rule for project acceptance
Next, we consider the selection of the optimal majority rule, k, for accepting a
project. Since our focus is on the symmetric optimal θ, we replace ~ with θ in the
functions V(θ,k,n) and P(θ,k,n,Q), henceforth.
Lemma 2 For a given n, V(θ,k,n) achieves a global maximum at either one value of
k or two adjacent values of k.
(The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix B.) For a given θ and n, let k*
denote the optimal majority rule for project acceptance, where k* satisfies
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V(θ,k*,n)≥V(θ,k*−1,n) and V(θ,k*,n)≥V(θ,k*+1,n). This translates into the
following optimality condition for k*:
1 H jBð Þ½ k*H jBð Þnk*
1 H jGð Þ½ k*H jGð Þnk*
   1 H jBð Þ½ 
k*1H jBð Þnk*þ1
1 H jGð Þ½ k*1H jGð Þnk*þ1
(13)
The solution of k* has an explicit form. Taking natural logs on both sides
of Eq. 13 and rearranging, we obtain
 ; n; ð Þ  k*   ; n; ð Þ þ 1 (14)
where  ; n; ð Þ  n"Rln"Aþ"R . If Γ (θ,n,β ) is an integer, k*=Γ (θ,n,β ) or
Γ (θ,n,β )+1, or both. If Γ (θ,n,β ) is not an integer, then k* is the integer that lies
between Γ (θ,n,β ) and Γ (θ,n,β )+1. Letting k*≅Γ (θ,n,β ), we obtain
@k*
@n
¼ "R
"A þ "R 2 0; 1ð Þ: (15)
3.3 Optimal organizational size
Since k* is increasing in n, it is easy to see that for a given k, V(θ,k,n) is single-
peaked in n, and there are at most two values of n, adjacent to each other, that
maximizes V(θ,k,n). A formal proof of this single-peak property is given in
Appendix C. Let n* denote the optimal organizational size for a given θ and k,
where V(θ,k,n*)>V(θ,k,n*−1) and V(θ,k,n*)>V(θ,k,n*+1). This yields the opti-
mality condition:
1 H jBð Þ½ kH jBð Þn*k
1 H jGð Þ½ kH jGð Þn*k
   1 H jBð Þ½ 
kH jBð Þn*kþ1
1 H jGð Þ½ kH jGð Þn*kþ1
(16)
which leads to the solution for n*, characterized as follows:
 ; k; ð Þ  1  n*   ; k; ð Þ (17)
where  ; k; ð Þ  "Aþ"Rð Þkþln"R . If Δ(θ,k,β) is an integer, then n* is Δ(θ,k,β) or
Δ(θ,k,β)+1, or both. If Δ(θ,k,β) is not an integer, then n* is the integer that lies
between Δ(θ,k,β) and Δ(θ,k,β)+1.
4 Simultaneous optimal choice of θ, k and n
With the results obtained in Section 3, we are ready to derive the optimal
organizational structure, where θ, k and n are optimized simultaneously. In this
case, all the optimality conditions in Eqs. 10, 11a, 13, 14, 16 and 17 must hold
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simultaneously, to characterize the optimal organizational structure {θ*,k*,n*}. By
substituting the optimality condition for θ* in Eq. 10 into Eq. 13, and simplifying,
we obtain
1 H *jBð Þ
1 H *jGð Þ 
h *jBð Þ
h *jGð Þ 
H *jBð Þ
H *jGð Þ (18)
Similarly, substituting Eq. 10 into Eq. 16 and simplifying, we obtain
1 H *jBð Þ
1 H *jGð Þ
h *jBð Þ
h *jGð Þ 
1 H *jBð Þ½ H *jBð Þ
1 H *jGð Þ½ H *jGð Þ (19)
Since H(θ*|B)>H(θ*|G), the optimality condition in Eq. 19 is more binding than in
Eq. 18. Together with Eq. 11b, this leads to the following condition for the choice
of the optimal decision criterion θ*:
Max
h0 *jBð Þ
h0 *jGð Þ ;
1 H *jBð Þ
1 H *jGð Þ

 
 h *jBð Þ
h *jGð Þ 
1 H *jBð Þ
1 H *jGð Þ
 	
H *jBð Þ
H *jGð Þ (20)
Next, the conditions in Eqs. 14 and 17 can be combined to yield the optimality
condition for the simultaneous choice of k* and n*:
n*"^R  ln
"^A þ "^R  k* 
ðn*þ 1Þ"^R  ln
"^A þ "^R (21)
where "^A  ln 1 H *jGð Þ½   ln 1 H *jBð Þ½  . This leads to our first main
result.
Proposition 1 The optimal design of the organization can be conducted as a two-
step process. First, select the optimal decision criterion θ* to satisfy the constraint
in Eq. 20, and then proceed to select k* and n* jointly to satisfy Eq. 21.
Proposition 1 indicates that while the optimal size, n*, and the optimal majority
rule, k*, varies with the investment environment β, in a specific manner, as given in
Eq. 21, the optimal decision criterion, θ*, is invariant with respect to β. This result
can be easily derived from the total differentiation of θ* with respect to β:
d*
d
¼ @*
@k
@k*
@n
þ @*
@n

 
@n*
@
¼ 0 (22)
where
@
@k
¼ Z "^A þ "^Rð Þ; @

@n
¼ Z"^R; @k

@n
¼ "^R
"^A þ "^R (23)
with Z defined earlier in the derivation of Eqs. 12a and 12b. This result implies that
while the optimal decision criterion θ* decreases with k and increases with n—as
we showed earlier in Eqs. 12a and 12b—the net effect on θ*, when k* and n* are
chosen optimally, is zero.
Moreover, from Eq. 21, it follows from the invariance property of the optimal
decision criterion θ* that the optimal organizational structure (k*,n*) is not unique.
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Therefore, when the decision-making quality is optimally set at θ*, small orga-
nizations can perform just as well as large organizations when the optimal majority
rule corresponding to the organizational size is adopted. Therefore, if there are no
costs incurred in enlarging the decision-making team, the optimal organizational size
is not unique.
However, if there are costs incurred in enlarging the decision-making team,
there will be a unique optimal organizational size. In this case, the unique optimal
organizational size will be the smallest feasible organization that maximizes the
expected net project payoff. In fact, we can show that when β<1, the unique
optimal organization is a hierarchy where k*=n*. Similarly, when β>1, the
polyarchy, where k*=1, is the unique optimal organization.
First, consider the hierarchy, where k=n. Using the result in Eq. 17, the hierarchy
is an optimal organizational structure if  ln"A  nH 
"Rln
"A
, where nH denotes the
optimal size of the hierarchy, where ɛA and ɛR are defined in Eqs. 2 and 3. In order
that nH>0, wemust have β<1. Similarly, in the case of the polyarchy, where k=1, this
is an optimal organizational structure if "Aþln"R  nP 
"Aþln 
"R
þ 1, where nP denotes
the optimal size of the polyarchy. The necessary condition for nP to be positive is
that β>1. It is easy to see that if the organizational size is restricted below nH, the
hierarchy is dominated by a decision rule to always reject projects. Similarly, if the
organizational size is restricted below nP, then the polyarchy is dominated by a
decision rule to always accept projects. Hence, nH and nP denote the smallest
feasible optimal organizational size for β<1 and β>1, respectively.3We thus obtain.
Proposition 2 When fixed costs are present in enlarging the organization, and the
decision criterion is chosen optimally, the unique optimal organizational structure
is a hierarchy when β<1, and a polyarchy when β>1.
Proposition 2 has interesting implications when related to the findings in Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (2001) and Koh (2005). Both papers showed that the hierarchy
and polyarchy can exist as optimal organizational structures only under specific
conditions regarding the investment environment. By contrast, we have found in our
study that the hierarchy and the polyarchy are in fact the unique optimal or-
ganizational structures, when there are costs involved in enlarging the organization.
The two sets of results complement each other, and apply in different settings. In
the setting considered in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001) and Koh (2005), which
focuses on sequential decision processes, the decision criterion is fixed at a level that
is not necessarily the optimal level. As a result, changes in the investment environ-
ment will necessitate optimal adjustments in both the organizational size and the
majority rule for acceptance to compensate for the fixed decision-making quality. By
contrast, in the present study, we allow all the elements of an organization—size,
majority rule and the decision criterion—to be simultaneously optimized. With the
decision criterion set at the optimal level (defined by the abilities of the decision-
makers), the hierarchy and the polyarchy turn out to be the only optimal organ-
izational structures that can exist when there are costs to enlarging the organization.
3 It follows from the result in Eq. 14 that if the size of the organization, n, is larger than nH when
β<1, k* will be less than n. Similarly, if n>nP when β>1, k* will be greater than one.
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The implication of these results is that the circumstances under which the
quality of organizational decision-making will vary with the organizational size
and the project acceptance rule are situations where either or both of these aspects
of the organizational structure are restricted from reaching their optimal levels, and
the decision criterion is fixed at a sub-optimal level.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a generalization of the project selection framework in Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1998), and extend the analysis to consider the simultaneous
optimal choice of the organizational size, quality majority rule and the decision
criterion. We demonstrate that when the structure and quality of organizational
decision-making are simultaneously optimized, the optimal decision criterion is
invariant with respect to the organizational size and majority rule, and is only a
function of the abilities of the decision-makers. As a result, the optimal design of
the organization can be conducted as a two-step process: first, determine the
optimal decision criterion, and then choose the optimal organizational size and the
project acceptance majority rule.
The invariance property of the optimal decision criterion implies that in the
absence of fixed costs, organizations of different sizes can be structured to yield the
same gross expected payoffs, if the optimal decision criterion and the optimal
majority rule for project acceptance are adopted. More importantly, if there are
fixed costs in employing additional decision-makers, and provided the decision
criterion is set at the invariant optimal level, there are only two possible types of
optimal organizational structures to adopt: the hierarchy (where full consensus is
required for acceptance) for a mediocre investment environment, and the polyarchy
(where the support of one decision-maker is sufficient) for an above-average
investment environment.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
[a] By the definition of MLRC, we have h xjGð Þh rjGð Þ >
h xjBð Þ
h rjBð Þ if x >r. Integrating over the
interval x 2 r; r½  , we have 1h r Gjð Þ
Rr
r
h x Gjð Þdx > 1h r Bjð Þ
Rr
r
h x Bjð Þdx . This leads to
1H r Gjð Þ
h r Gjð Þ >
1H r Bjð Þ
h r Bjð Þ .
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[b]Similarly, by MLRC, we have h rjGð Þh zjGð Þ >
h rjBð Þ
h zjGð Þ for z<r. Re-arranging, we obtain
h zjBð Þ
h rjBð Þ >
h zjGð Þ
h rjGð Þ for z<r. Hence,
1
h rjBð Þ
Rr
r
h z Bjð Þdz > 1h rjGð Þ
Rr
r
h z Gjð Þdz which leads
to H r Bjð Þh r Bjð Þ >
H r Gjð Þ
h r Gjð Þ .
[c] From Lemmas 1[a] and 1[b] , we have H rjBð ÞH rjGð Þ >
h rjBð Þ
h rjGð Þ >
1H rjBð Þ
1H rjGð Þ . This in turn
implies that H(r|G)<H(r|B), which is the result obtained in Milgrom (1981,
pp 383).
Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 2 Using the following relationship when the decision criterion is
the same for all decision-makers, we obtain
P ; k; n;Qð Þ  P ; k  1; n;Qð Þ ¼ Cnk1 1 H jQð Þ½ k1H jQð Þnkþ1
Therefore,
V ; k; nð Þ  V ; k  1; nð Þ ¼  Gð ÞCnk1 1 H jGð Þ½ k1H jGð Þnkþ1
þ 1 ð Þ Bð ÞCnk1 1 H jBð Þ½ k1H jBð Þnkþ1
Consider the following function:
 k; nð Þ  V ; k; nð Þ  V ; k  1; nð Þ  k; nð Þ V ; k þ 1; nð Þ  V ; k; nð Þ½ 
where
 k; nð Þ  k
n k þ 1


 1 H jGð Þ½ k1H jGð Þnkþ1þ 1 ð Þ 1 H jBð Þ½ k1H jBð Þnkþ1
 1 H jGð Þ½ kH jGð Þnkþð1 Þ 1 H jBð Þ½ kH jBð Þnk
	
Straightforward manipulation allows us to rewrite Φ(k, n) as follows:
 k; nð Þ   k; nð Þ H jBð Þ
1 H jBð Þ 
H jGð Þ
1 H jGð Þ
 	
where
 kð Þ
  1 ð ÞC
n
k1  Gð Þ þ Bð Þ½  1 H jBð Þ½ kH jBð Þnk 1 H jGð Þ½ kH jGð Þnk
 1 H jGð Þ½ kH jGð Þnkþ 1 ð Þ 1 H jBð Þ½ kH jBð Þnk
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By Lemma 1, we have H jGð Þ1H jGð Þ <
H jBð Þ
1H jBð Þ , so that it must be the case that
Φ(k, n)>0. Therefore, the following relationships must hold:
V ; k; nð Þ  V ; k  1; nð Þ ) V ; k  1; nð Þ > V ; k  2; nð Þ
V ; k; nð Þ  V ; k þ 1; nð Þ ) V ; k þ 1; nð Þ > V ; k þ 2; nð Þ
This completes the proof that V(θ, k, n) is single-peaked in k.
Q.E.D.
Appendix C
Lemma 3 For a given k, V(θ,k,n) achieves a global maximum at either one value of
n or two adjacent values of n.
Proof of Lemma 3 Consider the following difference:
V ; k; nð Þ  V ; k; n 1ð Þ ¼  Gð ÞCn1k1 1 H jGð Þ½ kH jGð Þnk
 1 ð Þ Bð ÞCn1k1 1 H jBð Þ½ kH jBð Þnk
Next, we construct the following function:
 k; nð Þ  V ; k; nþ 1ð Þ  V ; k; nð Þ½  	 k; nð Þ V ; k; nð Þ  V ; k; n 1ð Þ½ 
where
	 k; nð Þ  k
n k þ 1


 1 H jGð Þ½ kH jGð Þnkþ1þ 1 ð Þ 1 H jBð Þ½ kH jBð Þnkþ1
 1 H jGð Þ½ kH jGð Þnkþ 1 ð Þ 1 H jBð Þ½ kH jBð Þnk
	
Straightforward computation yields
 k; nð Þ   k; nð Þ H jGð Þ  H jBð Þ½  < 0
where Ψ(k, n) is defined in the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix B. Hence, the
following relationships hold:
V ; k; nð Þ  V ; k; n 1ð Þ ) V ; k; n 1ð Þ > V ; k; n 2ð Þ
V ; k; nð Þ  V ; k; nþ 1ð Þ ) V ; k; nþ 1ð Þ > V ; k; nþ 2ð Þ
which implies that V(θ, k, n) is single-peaked in n.
Q.E.D.
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